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Abstract
Rational choice theory predicts that humans always optimize the expected utility of options when making decisions.
However, in decision-making games, humans often punish their opponents even when doing so reduces their own reward.
We used the Ultimatum and Dictator games to examine the affective correlates of decision-making. We show that the
feedback negativity, an event-related brain potential that originates in the anterior cingulate cortex that has been related to
reinforcement learning, predicts the decision to reject unfair offers in the Ultimatum game. Furthermore, the decision to
reject is positively related tomore negative emotional reactions and to increased autonomic nervous system activity. These
ﬁndings support the idea that subjective emotional markers guide decision-making and that the anterior cingulate cortex
integrates instances of reinforcement and punishment to provide such affective markers.
Descriptors: Decision-making, Microeconomics, Feedback negativity, Somatic markers, Ultimatum game
In the Ultimatum and Dictator games, a ‘‘proposer’’ and a
‘‘responder’’ play against each other. In each case, the proposer is
instructed to divide 12 cents into 2 shares, the proportion of
which can range between 6:6 and 11:1. In the Ultimatum game,
the responder is required to decide whether or not to accept
the proposer’s offer. If the responder accepts the partitioning,
then each player receives the money offered by the proposer. If
the responder rejects the offer, then neither player receives any
money. Accordingly, this provides an opportunity for the re-
ceiver to punish the proposer for unfair offers. In the Dictator
game, the proposer’s role is the same but the responder cannot
reject the offer. Thus the responder has no option to reject unfair
offers and the money is always apportioned between the pro-
poser and the responder as the proposer dictates. In repeated
games, one and the same ‘‘proposer’’ and ‘‘responder’’ interact
several times whereas, in one-shot interactions, each responder is
confronted with a certain proposer only once.
In the one-shot Ultimatum game, economic rationality of
utility as derived from classical game theory (von Neumann &
Morgenstern, 1953) predicts that the responder should accept all
offers since receiving at least some money is always preferable to
receiving no money. However, empirical evidence shows that
humans often deviate from rational choice to varying degrees in
such experiments (Camerer, 2003; Gu¨th, Schmittberger, &
Schwarze, 1982). While some participants act rationally and
accept all offers, other participants reject offers that deviate even
slightly froman equal distribution. The latter might bemotivated
by negative affective responses to unfairness (Nowak, Page, &
Sigmund, 2000; van ‘t Wout, Kahn, Sanfey, & Aleman, 2006).
Indeed, previous research indicates the importance of affec-
tive processes inUltimatumdecisions. For example, in a study by
Pillutla and Murnighan (1996), participants who reported more
anger rejected more offers. More recently, Harle and Sanfey
(2007) showed that participants in the Ultimatum game who
were exposed to a sadness induction before playing rejected
relatively more fair offers, demonstrating that decision-making
can be inﬂuenced by negative emotions that are unrelated to the
task at hand. Furthermore, in another study, the skin conduc-
tance response to unfair offers, an autonomic measure of affect,
also predicted rejection of unfair offers in the Ultimatum game
(van ‘t Wout et al., 2006). Skin conductance responses have been
repeatedly associated with the reaction to aversive stimuli (e.g.,
Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2004; Meriau, Wartenburger,
Kazzer, Prehn, Villringer, et al., 2009). Furthermore, electrode-
rmal activity is believed to be related to physiological arousal
elicited by the behavioral inhibition system (Fowles, 1980),
which, in turn, is supposed to be the biological basis of punish-
ment and negative affect (Gray, 1982, 1994). In addition, unfair
offers in the Ultimatum game activate brain regions that are
associated with negative emotional reactions, such as the insula
(Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003; Tabibnia,
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Satpute, & Lieberman, 2008). Moreover, the fMRI data from
Sanfey and colleagues show that anterior cingulate cortex is ac-
tivated by unfair offers, which is consistent with the very recent
report of an increased negativity in the event-related potential
(ERP) between 240 and 320 ms in response to unfair Ultimatum
offers for receivers in a repeated Ultimatum Game against one
and the same proposer (Polezzi, Daum, Rubaltelli, Lotto, Civai,
et al., 2008). This negativity may be classiﬁed as a feedback neg-
ativity because of its topography and timing (Holroyd & Coles,
2002; Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997). Most importantly, we
suggest that participants will generate expectations in each trial
about the offer to be made by the other person. The presentation
of the actual offer represents feedback as to whether the mon-
etary outcome is equal to, or better or worse than, the partic-
ipants’ expectation.
The feedback negativity (FN, also known as the feedback
error-related negativity/feedback ERN) is a negative deﬂection
in the ERP, the maximum amplitude of which is recorded at the
scalp over frontal brain regions at about 250–300 ms following
negative as compared to positive performance feedback (Hol-
royd &Coles, 2002;Miltner et al., 1997) or losses as compared to
wins in gambling situations (Hewig, Trippe, Hecht, Coles, Hol-
royd &Miltner, 2007; Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, Holroyd, Schurger,
& Cohen, 2004; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004). Holroyd and Coles
(2002) have suggested that the process manifested by the FN is
involved in reinforcement learning. In terms of reinforcement
learning theory, more negative amplitudes to losses are related to
punishment when events are worse than expected. Punishment
leads to negative affective responses and is linked with the con-
cept of habitual or trait-like differences in negative affect (Gray,
1982, 1994). Thus, greater FN amplitudes indicating punishment
should evoke stronger negative affect. In contrast, more positive
amplitudes are thought to be related to a reinforcement response
when upcoming events are better than expected (Holroyd, Pak-
zad-Vaezi, & Krigolson, 2008). Ampliﬁed FN amplitudes in re-
sponse to aversive events have been found for participants who
are sensitive to aversive stimuli or negative affect, such as those
high in neuroticism, in trait negative affect, or behavioral inhi-
bition (Boksem, Tops, Wester, Meijman, & Lorist, 2006; Hajcak
et al., 2003; Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2004; Luu, Collins,
& Tucker, 2000; Pailing & Segalowitz, 2004). In the context of
the Ultimatum game, greater FN amplitudes to unfair offers
should reﬂect more negative responses and should lead to an
increased likelihood of remedial action in terms of rejection of
these unfair offers.
In the present study, we adopted a multilevel approach to
examine both basic mechanisms and individual differences in
decision-making in the one-shot Ultimatum and Dictator
Games. We collected data on behavior, subjective affect, and
central and autonomic nervous system activity to reveal the con-
tribution or inﬂuence of multiple levels of affective processing to
decision-making in these games. Speciﬁcally, we expected that
greater negative affective valence, larger skin conductance re-
sponses, and larger FN amplitudesFall indicating negative
affective processingFwould predict larger deviations from ra-
tional choice. This ﬁnding would provide direct evidence that
individual differences in affective processing contribute to differ-
ences in economic decision-making. It would further allow us to
analyze the relative contribution of, and the relationship among,
different aspects of affective processing that have been shown to
contribute signiﬁcantly to decision-making in the Ultimatum
Game (Polezzi et al., 2008; van ‘t Wout et al., 2006).
Methods
Participants
Thirteen participants were recruited from the student population
of the Friedrich Schiller University. The data of one participant
were excluded because he/she did not believe in the cover story of
the experiment and suspected that he/she had played the games
against a computer instead of a real human player. All others
denied having any such suspicion when asked at debrieﬁng. The
remaining 12 participants (8 females and 4 males; mean age: 21.6
years, SD5  1.5 years, range 20–25 years) were paid h6 per
hour plus an extra bonus that varied between h10.01 and h12.87
(Mean5 11.81; SD5  0.98) according to their decisions in the
games. After receiving verbal instructions about the experiment,
participants gave written consent for participation.
Task and Procedure
Each participant played both the Ultimatum and the Dictator
games repeatedly in a series of one-shot trials as a proposer and
as a receiver. In each trial, a proposer is instructed to divide a
ﬁxed amount of money (here 12 cents) into two shares: one for
him- or herself and the other for the responder. In the Ultimatum
game, the responder is prompted to decide whether or not he or
she accepts the offer of the proposer. If the responder accepts the
offer, then each player receives the money assigned by the pro-
poser. If the responder rejects the offer, then nomoney is given to
either player. In the Dictator game, the responder cannot reject
the offer and the money is always assigned to both players as
dictated by the proposer. First, the participants acted in the role
of the proposer in both games. Then they switched roles and
became responders.
In the role of the proposer, participants made 40 Ultimatum
and 10 Dictator proposals by typing in their proposals via a PC.
They were told that their proposals would be stored and used for
future participants and that they would receive only one offer from
a particular proposer when they later played the role of responder.
In addition, a photographwas takenof eachparticipant, whichwas
used to enhance the plausibility of the cover story. This picture and
that of the virtual proposer were presented following the feedback
in the responder games. Figure 1 shows a single trial in the
responder condition of the Ultimatum game.
After playing the game as proposers, the participants were
prepared for recording of electroencephalogram (EEG) and skin
conductance (see section on EEG and skin conductance
responses (SCR) recording and quantiﬁcation). Then, partici-
pants played the games in the role of the responder and received a
randomized series of 240 Ultimatum game offers (40 for each of
6 conditions: 6:6, 5:7, 4:8, 3:9, 2:10, 1:11). Each trial started with
the presentation of a ﬁxation cross (750 ms). This was followed
by a divided color bar (Figure 1) that indicated the amount of the
offer. The length of the blue portion indicated the amount offered
by the proposer, while the red portion indicated the amount
retained by the proposer. Four hundredmilliseconds later, a tone
(100 ms duration, 800 Hz) prompted the participants to respond
and to either accept or reject the offer within 2 s. Immediately
after their button press response, the amount of money that the
participant would receive on that trial was presented for 600 ms.
Finally, a photo of the participant and the pseudo-proposer on
that trial were presented for 1 s together with the amount of
money received by each one of them and the cumulative amount
of the participant’s winnings. On each trial, a different proposer
was presented, chosen randomly from a set of photographs either
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taken from preceding participants or from an archive of face
images. No proposer’s image was presented more than once
throughout the entire experiment. The picture was shown after
each trial in order to avoid confounding inﬂuences of the gender
of the opponent on decision-making (Solnick & Schweitzer,
1999). The Ultimatum game was followed by 60 trials of the
Dictator game with 10 trials for each of the 6 conditions. The
timing of each trial was the same as in the Ultimatum game. In
addition, after the participants ﬁnished all trials of each game,
they completed a subjective rating of the emotional valence (from
1/negative to 9/positive) that they had experienced in each con-
dition (6:6 through 11:1) while playing the role of responder.
EEG and Skin Conductance Recording and Quantiﬁcation
EEGand SCRsweremeasuredwhen participants were in the role
of the responder. Participants were seated individually in an
electrically shielded, dimly lit, and temperature controlled EEG
cabin, andAg/AgCl electrodes were applied for themeasurement
of electro-oculogram (EOG) and EEG. The EEG montage of
electrodes was realized by the Brain-Cap MR 128-channel elec-
trode system (EasyCap, Munich Germany) and included all
electrodes according to the extended 10–20 system (128 electrode
sites) referenced to vertex (Cz). Additionally, vertical EOG ac-
tivity was recorded from an electrode ﬁxed under the left eye. All
electrode sites were cleaned with alcohol and gently abraided
prior to electrode application to keep the impedances of elec-
trodes below 5 kO, and the differences of impedance between
homologous sites below 1 kO. EEG and EOG were ampliﬁed
with four 32-channel DC BrainAmp MR plus ampliﬁers (Brain
Products, Munich, Germany; input impedance: 10 MO). Band-
pass ﬁlter was set to 0.015–250 Hz; the signals were digitized
online at 500 Hz and stored on hard disk for later off-line an-
alyses. After data acquisition, EOG and EEG recordings were
subjected to off-line ocular correction, and automatic artifact
correction procedures were performed using the Vision Analyzer
software (BrainProducts). Trials with response times greater than
2000 ms were discarded from all analyses (mean: 3.75, SD: 5.72).
Data for each electrode were ﬁltered (high cut-off: 20 Hz),
epoched from  150 ms to 1400 ms following stimulus onset
(presentation of the color bar), and baseline corrected using the
average activity of the 100 ms preceding the offer onset. Finally,
EEG waveforms were averaged separately for each participant,
each experimental condition, and each electrode.
The peak amplitude of the FN to the presentation of the offer
was deﬁned as the average between 280 and 320 ms at electrode
Fz and was determined for each participant and each exper-
imental condition. Additionally, difference waves between fair
(6:6) and unfair (11:1) offers were calculated as the mean of the
difference in the time window of 280 to 320 ms. In addition, P3
amplitude was deﬁned as the average amplitude between 350 and
450 at electrode Pz (Coles & Rugg, 1995). The analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) of EEG data (FN amplitudes) associated with
offer presentation included the factors Fairness (6 levels: 6:6 to
11:1) and Game (Ultimatum versus Dictator). Additionally, two
factors for the topography of brain electrical activity were used
(AnteriorF5 levels: frontal, frontocentral, central, centropari-
etal, parietal; and LateralityF5 levels: lateral left, left, midline,
right, lateral right), which included the following 25 channels:
F3, F1, Fz, F2, F4, FC3, FC1, FCz, FC2, FC4, C3, C1, Cz, C2,
C4, CP3, CP1, CPz, CP2, CP4, P3, P1, Pz, P2, and P4, all ref-
erenced to linked mastoids. For topographical analyses, all elec-
trodes were used. Huynh-Feldt correction was applied as
appropriate to protect against violations of sphericity.
Skin conductance was recorded from the sole of the left foot
withAg/AgCl electrodes (6 mmdiameter and 0.28 cm2 recording
area) during application of a constant voltage of 0.5 Volt using a
VARIOPORT-C skin conductance ampliﬁer (Becker Meditech,
Karlsruhe, Germany). The measurement range was set to 50 mS
with a resolution of 0.002 mS. The data were high-pass ﬁltered
(0.1 Hz). The single trial data were baseline corrected ( 1 to 0 s
pre-stimulus). The maximum of the skin conductance response
was detected automatically between 1.5 and 7.5 s after the pre-
sentation of the offers. Only positive values were accepted as
valid changes of electrodermal activity (EDA). A Fairness (6
levels; 6:6 to 11:1)  Game (Ultimatum versus Dictator)
ANOVA was performed on the skin conductance responses.
Results
Behavior
We ﬁrst examined the general effect of the fairness of offers by the
proposer on the responders’ behavior in the Ultimatum game.
Fairness was deﬁned in terms of the proportional offer by the
proposer with 11:1 beingmost unfair and 6:6 being most fair. An
ANOVA revealed a main effect of Fairness (F(5,55)5 31.37,
po.001, Z25 .74). Figure 2A indicates that the probability of
the responder accepting an offer in the Ultimatum game de-
creased as a function of unfairness. Offers of 9:3 were accepted
signiﬁcantly more often (p5 .005) and offers of 11:1 were re-
jected more often (p5 .004) than offers of 10:2. Offers of 10:2
were accepted by responders on about 50% of trials and were
associated with the highest variance across participants, in ac-
cordance with previous results (Camerer, 2003).
Affect
Participants provided ratings of valence (on a Likert Scale, from
very negative 1 to very positive 9) to the monetary offers in both
games. The inclusion of the Dictator Game made it possible to
examinewhether the absence (Dictator) or presence (Ultimatum)
of the response choice inﬂuenced the dependent variables. An
ANOVA with the factors Game (2 levels; Ultimatum versus
Dictator) and Fairness (6 levels; 6:6 to 11:1) on these ratings
revealed a signiﬁcant effect of Fairness on the valence ratings
(F(5,55)5 82.92, po.001, Z25 .88) and no signiﬁcant main
effect of game or interactions with game (Ultimatum versus
Dictator, all values of p4.282). Accordingly, when confronted
with increasingly unfair offers in both games, participants
reported more negative emotional reactions (Figure 2B).
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Figure 1. Timeline of a single trial in the Ultimatum game.
Electrodermal Responses
An analysis of the skin conductance responses revealed a mar-
ginally signiﬁcant main effect of fairness (F(5,55)5 2.65,
p5 .072, Z25 .19) and a signiﬁcant linear contrast effect of fair-
ness (F(1,11)5 5.24, p5 .043, Z25 .32), indicating greater skin
conductance responses as a function of increasing unfairness (see
Figure 2C). In particular, extremely unfair offers (11:1) elicited
higher skin conductance responses as compared to extremely fair
(6:6) offers (p5 .015). Data were collapsed across games because
of an absence of signiﬁcant main or interaction effects involving
Game (all values of p4.131).
Electrophysiology
An ANOVA on FN amplitudes elicited by the offer with the
factors Fairness, Game, and Electrode Position revealed a sig-
niﬁcant interaction between Fairness and Electrode Position
(Fairness  Anterior: F(20,220)5 3.04, p5 .011, Z25 .22).
Post-hoc tests of this interaction showed a linear trend with
more negative amplitudes for increasingly unfair offers at more
anterior sites indicating stronger FN amplitudes for unfair as
compared to fair offers (F(1,11)5 6.20, p5 .030,Z25 .36). Data
were collapsed across games because of an absence of signiﬁcant
main or interaction effects involving Game (all values of p4.2).
Figure 3A depicts the ERP waveforms for extremely unfair
(11:1) versus fair (6:6) offers, averaged across games. The asso-
ciated difference wave between unfair and fair offers, illustrated
in Figure 3A, reﬂects the pure effect of fairness on FN and,
consistent with classical deﬁnitions of FN, exhibits a frontocen-
tral topographical distributionover the scalp as shown inFigure 3B.
An ANOVA on the P3 data revealed a main effect of Fair-
ness (F(5,55)5 3.36, p5 .011, Z25 .23) and a quadratic trend in
post-hoc contrasts (F(1,11)5 5.38, p5 .041, Z25 .33). The P3
was largest for extremely unfair offers (11:1;M5 5.04 mV), and
declined with fairness showing a minimum for 9:3 offers
(M5 2.26 mV) and then increased again with increasing fairness
(for 6:6; M5 3.01 mV). Thus, P3 showed a different effect pat-
tern as compared to FN. There were no other signiﬁcant main or
interaction effects of Game or Fairness for the P3 data (all values
of p4.062).
Individual Difference Analyses
The previous analyses showed that rejection rates, negative emo-
tional reactions, FN amplitudes, and skin conductance responses
were all inversely related to the fairness of the offers. Subsequent
correlation analyses investigated the factors associated with in-
dividual differences in the responders’ choice behavior in the
Ultimatum game. Hypotheses about correlations with other
measures were tested with one-tailed tests. Because the between-
participant variability in the decision to accept the 10:2 offerswas
largest, it most clearly reﬂects individual differences in decision-
making. According to rational choice theory, the more likely a
person rejects these offers the greater is the deviation from ra-
tionality. The data associated with this condition were evaluated
in subsequent individual difference analyses. In these analyses,
for each participant, we averaged the ratings of subjective valence
across the Fairness and Game conditions to provide an overall
measure of each individual’s affective response to outcomes in
general, since the ratings in different conditions were highly cor-
related. The reliability of the aggregated measure was .91 (Cron-
bach’s alpha). Because skin conductance responses in each
condition were also highly correlated across the Ultimatum and
Dictator games, we also used an aggregated measure for subse-
quent correlation analyses (Cronbach’s alpha: .97). This aggre-
gated measure reﬂected the responsiveness of the autonomic
nervous systemof each participant.We further utilized individual
differences in FN to examine its relationship with decision-mak-
ing and affect. For the analysis of the FN, the FN was measured
at its maximum at channel Fz by evaluating the ERPs elicited by
fair (6:6) and unfair offers (11:1) as well as their difference in the
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Figure 2. Unfairness is related to rejections of offers, negative emotions,
and the amplitude of the skin conductance response. (A) Mean
probabilities of ‘‘accept’’ decisions across all participants and for all
decisions in the Ultimatum game show a decrease in acceptance with
increasing unfairness. (B) Subjective ratings of emotional valence for each
level of fairness across Ultimatum and Dictator games show more
negative emotional responses with increasing unfairness (1 extremely
negative to 9 extremely positive). (C) Skin conductance responses for
each level of fairness across Ultimatum and Dictator games show an
increase in the response with increasing unfairness.
Ultimatum Game. Recent evidence (Holroyd et al., 2008) shows
that the main effect in ERP analyses of FN amplitudes is due to
the reduction of FN after good outcomes (fair offers in the pres-
ent study) rather than increased FN to bad outcomes (here un-
fair). Thus, we examined the separate contribution of FN
responses to extremely fair (6:6) and unfair (11:1) offers in sub-
sequent analyses in addition to the difference amplitudes.
The correlation analyses addressed the question of the rela-
tionship between subjective emotional responses, FN ampli-
tudes, and skin conductance responses, on the one hand, and the
degree of participant rationality, as deﬁned in terms of their re-
sponses to the 10:2 offers. Results show that the responders who
more frequently rejected the 10:2 offer rated the proposers’ offers
as emotionally more negative in general (r5  .61, p5 .017).
Larger skin conductance responses also predicted higher rejec-
tion rates (r5 .56, p5 .028). Those who tended to reject the 10:2
offer also tended to show larger FN amplitudes to unfair (11:1)
versus fair (6:6) offers in the Ultimatum game (r5  .44,
p5 .078). While FN amplitudes to 11:1 offers were not related to
rejection rate (r5  .04), reduced FN amplitudes to 6:6 offers in
the Ultimatum Game were signiﬁcantly related to the rejection
rate, with high rejection rates being associated with smaller FN
amplitudes (r5 .58, p5 .023). For FN amplitudes to offers of
10:2, 9:3, 8:4, and 7:5, there was no signiﬁcant correlation with
rejections (all values of p4.17). Accordingly, in subsequent
multiple regression analyses the FN amplitude to fair offers was
used. As shown in Figure 4, a multiple regression analysis on
individual differences in 10:2 rejection rates revealed that FN
amplitudes to fair offers, SCR amplitude, and emotional valence
ratings together accounted for a large proportion of variance of
the behavioral data (R25 .84, F(3,8)5 13.7, p5 .002). The step-
wise introduction of each of these three predictors revealed that
each predictor explained a substantial independent amount of
variance (see Table 1). Emotional ratings and skin conductance
responses explained 38% and 35% of variance, respectively. FN
introduced as the third predictor further explained a marginally
signiﬁcant but substantial amount of additional variance (11%).
In order to further verify these results, we used a Jackknifemethod
repeating the multiple regression analysis 12 times, omitting
a different participant in each analysis (Tukey, 1958). The
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Figure 4. Results of a multiple regression in which the number of
rejections of the 10:2 offer is predicted by ERP amplitudes to fair offers,
subjective emotional ratings (Valence), and skin conductance responses
(EDA). These variables together explain 84% of the variance in number
of rejections (for more details, see Table 1).
Figure 3. The effect of fairness on event-related potentials and their
topography after the presentation of fair versus unfair offers across games.
(A) ERPs for 11:1 and 6:6 offers and the difference waveform. Data for
frontal (Fz), central (Cz), and parietal (Pz) electrodes are presented. A
greater negativity at frontal sites is present for unfair as compared to fair
offers at 290 ms. (B) The topographic current source density map of the
peak of the difference waveform shows the distribution of the feedback
negativity over the cortex. The data were band-pass ﬁltered to exclusively
show FN related theta activity for the ﬁgure only (3–8 Hz).
standardized beta weights were consistent for all analyses. The
weights varied between  .52 and  .74 for the inﬂuence of the sub-
jective emotional ratings, between .37 and .66 for the SCR scores,
and between .13 and .45 for the ERP amplitudes (see Table 2).
Exploratory analyses of the relationship between P3 ampli-
tudes and variables discussed in this section failed to reveal any
signiﬁcant effects. Further, analysis of the behavior of the par-
ticipant when acting as proposer failed to reveal any signiﬁcant
relations with their behavior as responder or any of the variables
mentioned above (all values of p4.5).
Discussion
We have shown that unfair offers in the one-shot Ultimatum
game were rejected more frequently, evoked more negative sub-
jective emotional ratings, led to greater SCRs, and elicited larger
FNs, than fair offers. Moreover, individual differences in the
number of rejected 10:2 offers in the Ultimatum Game could be
explained to a large extent by a combination of subjective emo-
tional ratings, SCRs, and reduced FN amplitudes to fair offers.
Our results are consistent with previous work that has reported
ﬁnding similar relationships between emotional responses and
rejection rate (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996), between SCRs and
rejection rate (van ‘t Wout et al., 2006), and between FN am-
plitudes and rejection rate in a repeated Ultimatum game (Pole-
zzi et al., 2008). In particular, by measuring these three different
correlates of rejection rates within the same experimental context,
we have shown that smaller FNs to fair offers, more negative
emotional ratings, and larger SCRs predicted more rejections,
that is, larger deviations from rational choice. The multiple re-
gression analysis indicated that each of these three indicators of
affective processing contributed an independent additional por-
tion of variance (see Table 1). The physiological variables were
uncorrelated with the subjective emotional responses (see Table 2),
indicating that conscious emotional experience can be indepen-
dent from physiological responses.1
On the level of the physiological variables, the regression
analysis might suggest that two systems involved in affective
processing contribute independently to inﬂuence irrational deci-
sion-making. First, the autonomic nervous system as reﬂected by
SCRs has been associated with activation of the amygdala (e.g.,
Davis, 1992; Furmark, Fischer, Wik, Larsson, & Fredrikson,
1997; Phelps & LeDoux, 2005). The amygdala isFamong other
structuresFsaid to control SCRs through the regulation of the
sympathetic nervous system. For example, Furmark et al. (1997)
found a signiﬁcant relation between regional cerebral blood ﬂow
in the amygdala and electrodermal ﬂuctuations. It has to be
noted that SCRs and feedback negativity were correlated (see
Table 2). This is in line with ﬁndings that anterior cingulate is also
involved in electrodermal control (Fredrikson, Furmark, Olsson,
Fischer, Andersson, & Langstrom, 1998). However, the regres-
sion analyses revealed that the FN explained an additional in-
dependent amount of variance. This suggests that the activities of
a reinforcement learning system, as reﬂected in the FN and as-
sociated with the midbrain dopamine system and the anterior
cingulate cortex, contributes independently to the explanation of
variability in decision-making (Hewig, Straube, Trippe, Hecht,
Kretschmer, et al., 2009; Hewig et al., 2007; Holroyd & Coles,
2002; Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, Nystrom, Mars, et al.,
2004; Jocham & Ullsperger, 2009; Ullsperger & von Cramon,
2003).Mathematicalmodels of reinforcement learning (Sutton&
Barto, 1998) suggest that individuals learn from the detection of
differences between the expected and actual reinforcement. Thus,
any outcome of a decision or a behavioral act can be either better
or worse than expected, and the size and valence of the discrep-
ancy is proposed to be reﬂected in the amplitude of the FN. In
line with this proposal, FN amplitude is smaller when an out-
come is better than expected and larger when the outcome is
worse than expected, (e.g., Hewig et al., 2007; Holroyd &
Krigolson, 2007). Conversely, outcomes that are better than ex-
pected lead to an increase in the activity of the midbrain dopa-
mine system, inhibition of the apical dendrites of motor neurons
in the ACC, and production of small amplitude FNs or of an
outcome positivity (OP) or a feedback-related positivity (Hol-
royd et al., 2008). Within this theoretical framework, anterior
cingulate cortex is thought to integrate reinforcement history to
guide voluntary behavior (Holroyd &Coles, 2008). It has further
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Table 1. Results of the Multiple Regression Analysis
Model R R2 corrR2 SE
Change statistics
DR2 DF df 1 df 2 p of DF
a .614 .377 .315 12.56 .377 6.05 1 10 .034
b .855 .731 .672 8.69 .354 11.87 1 9 .007
c .915 .837 .776 7.18 .106 5.21 1 8 .052
Notes. Model a. Variables: (constant), Valence. Model b. Variables: (con-
stant), Valence, EDA. Model c. Variables: (constant), Valence, EDA,
ERP at Fz for 6:6 in Ultimatum. Dependent variable: Rejections at 10:2
offers. R and R2 multiple correlation and explained variance (co-
rrR25 corrected); SE5 standard error, DR25 change in R2 speciﬁc for
this variable, DF5 change in F, df5degrees of freedom (nominator and
denominator), p of DF5 signiﬁcance of change in DF.
Table 2. Correlation Between Variables and beta Weights in the
Multiple Regression
Correlations EDA FN Rej10:2
Multiple Regression
beta T p–value beta range
Valence .050  .054  .614  .616  4.303 .003  .522 to  .742
EDA .427 .564 .440 2.785 .024 .371 to .661
FN .582 .361 2.282 .052 .133 to .456
Notes. Valence5 emotional ratings; EDA5 electrodermal activity/skin
conductance responses; ERP at Fz for 6:6 in Ultimatum5FN, Re-
j10:25number of rejections for 10:2 offers. Beta5 standardized beta
weight in the multiple regression analysis; T and p-values of the stan-
dardized beta weight, beta range5 range of beta values in the 12 Jack-
knife regression analyses.
1It might be argued that using several dependent variables increases
the number of statistical tests and thusmay lead to a type I error inﬂation.
However, for the present study most of the effects for each single variable
had been found previously and were clearly predicted by directed
hypotheses. Thus, they are conceptual replications, which is one of the
most important tools to oppose type I error problems.Moreover, a type I
error correction does increase the probability of a type II errorFthe
probability not to detect an effect that is present in the population. Ac-
cordingly, replicating previous results is hindered signiﬁcantly if type II
error probability is increased because the chance of a successful replica-
tion is reduced. Hence, we decided to avoid an increase in type II error
and did not use a type I error correction.
been suggested that FN amplitude may reﬂect somatic markers
of reinforcement and punishment (Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis, Ye-
ung, & Cohen, 2003). The somatic marker hypothesis (e.g., Be-
chara & Damasio, 2005; Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000)
holds that somatic markers, which are autonomic signals that
indicate the positive and negative consequences of experienced
stimuli, guide decision-making. Positive somatic markers asso-
ciated with an action increase the likelihood of its selection,
whereas negative somatic markers of an action decrease the like-
lihood of its selection. Accordingly, the present ﬁndings suggest
that affective somatic markers may contribute to rejections in the
Ultimatum Game. Such markers may also be an important
source of motivation for altruistic punishment against other
players who defect, do not cooperate, or show egoistic behavior
(Fehr & Camerer, 2007; Fehr & Gachter, 2002). The proposed
neuroanatomical basis for the somatic marker is the ventrome-
dial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), which includes the orbitofron-
tal, the medial frontal, and parts of the anterior cingulate cortex.
Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest that a reinforcement
learning mechanism involving anterior cingulate cortex and
VMPFC uses affective markers to guide behavior in complex
decision-making situations.
We hypothesized that increased FN would be related to
heightened rejection rate.However, the present data indicate that
the number of rejections was related to more positive amplitudes
to fair offers rather than to more negative amplitudes to unfair
offers. The present data cannot provide an explanation for this
ﬁnding. On the one hand, it may be argued that lower FN am-
plitudes to fair offers would indicate that participants expect
proposers to make unfair offers and hence are positively sur-
prised when the offers are fair. In line with this reasoning, neg-
ative views of others and negative expectations concerning
others’ intentions might at the same time lead to more rejections
of unfair offers. On the other hand, the fact that participants
showed increased positivity towards fair offersmight suggest that
the participants were particularly sensitive to reward. For ex-
ample, pathological gamblers show more positive amplitudes to
reinforcing events (Hewig, Kretschmer, Trippe, Hecht, Coles,
et al., 2010). According to this idea, more reward-sensitive par-
ticipants might be disappointed by unfair offers and reject them
more often. Future research will be necessary to shed more light
on this result.
The statistical analyses revealed no signiﬁcant effects of Game
in the sense that there were no differences in the EEG, EDA, or
subjective responses between offers in the Ultimatum as com-
pared to the Dictator game. Accordingly, our ﬁndings indicate
that the processes we have identiﬁed are related primarily to an
evaluation of unfairness and the motivation to oppose unfair-
ness, rather than the preparation or initiation of remedial action
against unfairness. Thus, the data also indicate that FN might
not primarily reﬂect direct behavioral reinforcement learning
here but rather a more general form of reinforcement learn-
ingFthe learning of action values or the learning of the moti-
vational value of a situation (e.g., Holroyd & Coles, 2002, 2008;
Kennerley, Walton, Behrens, Buckley, & Rushworth, 2006; Wal-
ton, Croxson, Behrens, Kennerley, & Rushworth, 2007). In ac-
cordancewith this suggestion, previous studies have shown that a
FN is present in the absence of response choice (Yeung, Holroyd,
& Cohen, 2005), which is in line with the observed FN in the
Dictator game in the present study. In addition, it may be noted
that, in the Dictator game and in the Ultimatum game (accepted
offer trials), the presentation of the offers indicates the exact
monetary feedback that can be expected. Moreover, for all low
offers in the Ultimatum game, the presentation of the offer
already signals the low outcome of the current trial (either being
1 or 2 cents upon accept and 0 cents upon reject). Since FN seems
to migrate back to the earliest indicator of reinforcement,
as shown by Dunning and Hajcak (2007), the offerFin terms of
reinforcement learningFalready implies the likely decision and
thus the ﬁnal outcome. Thus, the presentation of the offer con-
veys very similar information about outcome in both games.
Taken together, this might explain the absence of differences
between the Ultimatum and Dictator games.
In summary, our data corroborate previous ﬁndings indicating
the importance of emotional processes in decision-making. Our
data further reveal the presence of several independent sources of
variance that each contribute to human decision-making in the
Ultimatum game.
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